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NOTES
TITLE IX DOES NOT APPLY TO FACULTY
EMPLOYMENT
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex in any educational program or activity receiv-
ing federal financial assistance.I In 1975 the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) promulgated regulations implement-
ing Title IX.2 Subpart E of these regulations, entitled "Discrimination
on the Basis of Sex in Employment in Education Programs and Activi-
ties Prohibited,"' 3 addresses employment,4 employment criteria,5 re-
cruitment,6 compensation,7 job classification and structure,8 fringe
benefits,9 marital or parental status,' 0 advertising," pre-employment
inquiries,' 2 and sex as a bona fide occupational qualification.1 3
I. Education Amendments of 1972, Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1685 (1976). Title IX in-
cludes sections 901-905 of the Education Amendments. Section 901(a) is reproduced in part in the
text accompanying note 18 infra.
2. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.1-.71 (1978). Section 86.51(a)(1) of the HEW regulations provides:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in employment, or recruitment, considera-
tion, or selection therefor, whether full-time or part-time, under any education program
or activity operated by recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial assist-
ance.
Id. § 86.51(a)(1). The authority to issue these regulations is derived from section 902 of Title IX:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial
assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract. . . is
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title with re-
spect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders to general appli-
cability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute
authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). On May 4, 1980, jurisdiction over educational matters was transferred to
the new Department of Education. The new regulations have been reissued in identical form by
the department at 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1-.71; see 45 Fed. Reg. 30,802 (May 9, 1980). To be consistent
with the cases and secondary literature on the subject, this note refers throughout to the regula-
tions promulgated by HEW and to HEW's authority under Title IX.
3. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1978).
4. Id. § 86.51.
5. Id. § 86.52.
6. Id. § 86.53.
7. Id. § 86.54.
8. Id. § 86.55.
9. Id. § 86.56.
10. Id. § 86.57.
11. Id. § 86.59.
12. Id. § 86.60.
13. Id. § 86.61.
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These regulations were immediately and unsuccessfully chal-
lenged in Congress as being in excess of the authority granted by Title
IX because HEW had included faculty employment practices within
their purview. 14 Although the regulations survived two more congres-
sional challenges, 15 by the end of July, 1980, the Courts of Appeals for
the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth circuits had uniformly held
that various sections of subpart E exceeded HEW's authority under Ti-
tle X and were therefore invalid and unenforceable. 16 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, recently decided in North Ha-
ven Board of Education v. Hufstedler17 that the HEW regulations are
valid.
14. Regulations issued under Title 20 of the United States Code become effective not less
than 45 days after transmission to Congress "unless the Congress shall, by concurrent resolution,
find that the final regulation is inconsistent with the Act from which it derives its authority, and
disapprove such final regulation, in whole or in part." 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232(d)(1) (West Supp.
1980). (At the time of the congressional challenge, the statutory language differed slightly.) Sena-
tor Helms and Representative O'Hara introduced concurrent resolutions disapproving all or part
of the HEW regulations, but both resolutions were defeated. See S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 17,301 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 330, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC.
21,687 (1975). See also North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 783 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. granted sub nom North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S. Ct. 1345 (1981).
15. In 1975 Senator Helms introduced a bill, S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC.
23,845 (1975), that in part would have amended section 901 to exempt employees from coverage
under Title IX, thereby limiting the scope of the regulations. The bill failed. Id. In 1976 Senator
McClure introduced Amendment No. 389, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), to the Education Amend-
ments bill of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), to clarify section 901 by adding a definition of
"education program or activity." This amendment, which also would have limited the scope of
the regulations, likewise failed. 122 CONG. REC. 28,136 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980),petition
for cert.fled sub non Hufstedler v. Dougherty County School Sys., 49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Jan.
13, 1981) (No. 80-1023); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert.
granted sub nom Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 101 S. Ct. 563 (1980); Romeo Community
Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v.
Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v.
Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). The lower courts in other
circuits have also uniformly held that HEW's regulations exceed Title IX's authority. See Grove
City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Kneeland v. Bloom Township High
School Dist. No. 206,484 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 486 F. Supp.
862 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), ajid, 632 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980); Auburn School Dist. v. HEW, 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1504 (D.N.H. 1979), appealdismissed, No. 79-1261 (1st Cir. Jan. 16, 1980); Board
of Educ. v. HEW, No. C78-177, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 457 (N.D. Ohio 1979). Arthur Larson,
in his treatise on employment discrimination, agrees with these cases. See 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOY-
MENT DIscRIMINATION 2-121 to 2-123 (1980) ("The argument based on legislative history ... is
almost completely on the side of the decided cases").
17. 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. grantedsub nonL North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101
S. Ct. 1345 (1981). The North Haven court actually decided two cases together on appeal from the
District Court for the District of Connecticut. Both cases squarely addressed whether HEW's
implementing regulations had exceeded the authority of Title IX. In both cases the district judge
ruled that HEW had exceeded its authority, and the Government appealed. 629 F.2d at 774-75.
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This Note discusses the controversy over the regulations imple-
menting Title IX, concluding that they exceed statutory authority and
that the North Haven case was wrongly decided. In addition, this Note
suggests that Title IX authorizes supervision of the employment prac-
tices of educational institutions receiving federal financial assistance
only when gender discrimination has a deleterious effect on students
who are direct beneficiaries of the federal financial assistance.
I. THE CONTROVERSY
The controversy over HEW's interpretation of Title IX centers on
the wording of section 901(a), which provides that "[n]o person...
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... ,,18
Every court to interpret section 901(a) except the North Haven court
has concluded that it is limited in coverage either to students or pro-
spective students, or to teachers engaged in federally financed special
research. 19 In the implementing regulations, however, HEW inter-
preted section 901(a) to extend also to employment discrimination on
the basis of sex.20 Under this interpretation, an educational institu-
tion's hiring and promotion practices, as well as its treatment of stu-
dents, come under the scrutiny of HEW if that institution receives
federal funds. The HEW position and the North Haven decision are
based on an expansive reading of section 901(a) and on a unique inter-
pretation of the legislative history of Title IX.
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
19. See, eg., Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1031-32, (E.D. Mich.
1977), aft'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979):
Though cast in broad terms, § 1681 nevertheless addresses itself only to sex discrimina-
tion against the participants in and the beneficiaries of federally assisted education pro-
grams. Section 1681 must therefore be read to protect from sex discrimination only those
persons for whom the federally assisted education programs are established, and this can
only mean the school children in those programs. As a reference to faculty employees,
the language of§ 1681 is indirect, if not obscure. Teachers participate in these programs
only to the extent that they may teach and help administer some of them; teachers benefit
from these programs only to the extent that the funds for them may be used to pay their
salaries; teachers are "subjected to discrimination under" these programs, (emphasis ad-
ded), only to the extent that the programs themselves may be established and operated in
an employment-related discriminatory way. Teachers, in short, are hard pressed to fit
themselves within the plain meaning of§ 1681's prohibitory language, general as it may
appear on its face.
20. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.51(a)(1) (1979); Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 14, Harris v. Is-
leboro School Comm., 444 U.S. 972 (1979): "Title IX... unambiguously prohibits sex discrimi-
nation against employees in education programs and activities receiving federal aid without
regard to the primary objective of the aid, and it accordingly authorizes HEW to issue and enforce
regulations effectuating that prohibition."
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The North Haven court began its opinion by noting the disagree-
ment between HEW and the courts concerning the proper interpreta-
tion of section 901(a),21 and by asserting that the statute was
ambiguous. Thus, at the outset the court rejected HEW's argument
that the language of section 901(a) plainly encompasses employment
discrimination. Instead, the court concluded the true meaning can be
found only by examining the congressional intent behind Title IX.22
Turning to the legislative history, the court discussed what it con-
sidered to be a stronger argument: HEW contended that Congress's
failure to enact a provision proposed by the House of Representatives
(section 904) that would have expressly excluded employment discrimi-
nation from the purview of Title IX showed that Congress intended
Title IX to cover employment discrimination.2 3 Relying primarily on
the written and oral remarks of Title IX's sponsor, Senator Bayh, the
court concluded that HEW's contention was correct.24 This conclusion
constitutes the main pillar of the North Haven court's holding. The
court attempted to bolster its conclusion by examining the post-enact-
ment history of Title IX, but recognized that such an examination was
"not conclusive" and did little more than add "some additional weight
to the view that section 901 was expressly intended to relate to employ-
ment practices. '25 A detailed analysis of the language and the legisla-
tive history of Title IX demonstrates, however, that the North Haven
decision was erroneous.
II. THE LANGUAGE OF TITLE IX
In the many cases involving section 901(a), HEW has consistently
argued that an analysis of the statutory language conclusively shows
that Title IX protects employees as well as students.26 In its brief sup-
21. 629 F.2d at 777-78.
22. Id. at 778.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 778-83.
25. Id. at 784.
26. During the congressional hearings on the Title IX implementing regulations, HEW Sec-
retary Caspar Weinberger asserted that the plain language of section 901(a) encompasses employ-
ment discrimination. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Postsecondary Education of the House Comm on Edu. andLabor, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 466 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]. He offered no explanation for his assertion, however, and since
section 901(a) does not contain the word "employment," it is difficult to understand the basis of
this assertion. The wording of the regulation affecting faculty employment, 45 C.F.R.
§ 86.51(a)(1) (1979), is largely a copy of section 901(a), compare note 2supra with text accompany-
ing note 18 supra, with the exception that the word "employment" is contained in the regulation
but not in the statute. If the plain language of the statute encompasses employment, it is difficult
to understand why the writers of the HEW regulation believed it necessary to add an employment
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porting its petition for certiorari in Islesboro School Committee v.
Caiano,27 for example, HEW stated that "[e]mployees of an educa-
tional institution are as susceptible of being. .. 'subjected to discrimi-
nation!" under federally-funded programs as students, and concluded
that the "no person" language of section 901(a) should be interpreted
broadly to include faculty employment.28 Likewise, the court in
Dougherty County School Systems v. Harris,29 agreeing with HEW's in-
terpretation, emphasized that section 901(a) begins with the words "no
person" rather than a more limited category like "no student. '30
No other court has accepted HEW's analysis of the "no person"
language. Even the North Haven court thought the language of section
901(a) "ambiguous," 31 and indicated that the actual meaning of the
statute could be determined only by examining the legislative history.3 2
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit emphatically rejected
clause to the language of the statute in writing the regulation. HEW's "Plain language" argument,
in short, is without adequate foundation.
27. 593 F.2d 424 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
28. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 13. One commentator has recently
agreed with this argument, stating that "[i]f some portion of a school's federal financial aid is
allocated to paying teacher salaries, those employees should be viewed as performing federally-
assisted educational activities," and therefore are within the purview of the "subjected to discrimi-
nation" clause of section 901(a). Friedman, Congress, the Courts, and Sex-based Employment Dis-
crimination in Higher Education A Tale of Two Titles, 34 VAND. L. Rav. 37, 59 (1981). If this
view is correct, any employees of federally-financed educational institutions, not just teachers,
would be protected by Title IX. No one has ever suggested such a broad mandate for Title IX.
29. 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980), petitionfor cert. filed sub nonm Hufstedler v. Dougherty
County School Sys., 49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 80-1023).
30. Id. at 737. Although the Dougherty court affirmed without analysis the lower court's
ruling that the implementing regulations exceeded statutory authority, id. at 738, the court stated
in dictum that because section 901(a) does not begin with a more limited phrase than "no person,"
such as "no student," Congress intended section 901(a) to encompass persons other than students,
such as faculty, id. at 737-38. The court purported to find a "middle ground" between HEW and
the courts that had previously decided the issue, stating that a "female teacher whose salary is
defrayed by federal funds and who is paid less than a male teacher in the same program is sub-
jected to discrimination under the program." Id. This idea, however, is not new. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that section 901(a) is aimed not only at students, but also at
"teachers engaged in special research being funded by the United States government." Islesboro
School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d at 426. The Islesboro court based its reasoning on the idea
that such teachers would be "beneficiaries of. . .federal monies." Id. at 426. The Dougherty
court's analysis, however, while reaching the same conclusion--that Title IX could reach faculty
employment-proceeded on the idea that the "no person" language of the statute is not limited to
students. This analysis overlooks the fact that a more limited phrase such as "no student" would
have been too restrictive for the purposes of section 901(a). For example, a person denied admis-
sion to a federally financed institution on the basis of sex might not be a "student," yet should be
protected by the title. The "no person" language employed in the statute is appropriately broad to
encompass such situations; more limiting language such as "no student" would be inappropriately
narrow.
31. 629 F.2d at 777.
32. Id. at 778.
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HEW's "no person" argument: "The language of section 901,. .. on
its face, is aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal monies .... The
section does not include employees within its terms. ' 33 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found HEW's "construction... to be
strained. '34
Acceptance of HEW's interpretation of the "no person" language
of the statute would incorrectly broaden the scope of section 901(a).
HEW's interpretation effectively rewords section 901(a) to read, "No
person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. ' 35 The actual statutory language that no person shall, be-
cause of sex discrimination, "be excluded from participation in"' 36 or
"be denied the benefits of''37 programs receiving federal assistance is
unnecessary under the HEW interpretation because, in HEW's view,
anyone who is "excluded from participation in" or "denied the benefits
of" a federally funded program on the basis of sex is also "subjected to
discrimination" on the basis of sex. The "participation" and "benefits"
clauses thus become surplusage in the presence of the more general
"discrimination" clause, and may be removed without altering the
meaning HEW imputes to the statute.
To render clauses of the statute surplusage in this manner violates
the rule of statutory construction that "[a] statute should be construed
so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoper-
ative or superfluous, void or insignificant .... -38 HEW's interpreta-
tion of section 901(a) broadens the effect of the "discrimination" clause,
swallowing up the other enumerating clauses in the statute, so that
those clauses no longer have meaning.
Furthermore, section 901(a) enumerates three types of sex discrim-
ination39-- discrimination preventing participation, discrimination de-
nying benefits, and discrimination in general-so that the last, a
general phrase, is preceded by more specific phrases. Under the con-
struction doctrine of ejusdem generis, when "general words follow spe-
33. Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d at 426.
34. Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
972 (1979).
35. See text accompanying note 18 supra for the actual language of the statute.
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
37. Id.
38. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 63 (4th ed. 1973). "[It is
a] general proposition that a statute should not be construed in such a way as to render certain
provisions superfluous or insignificant." Zeigler Coal Co. v. Kleppe, 536 F.2d 398, 406 (D.C. Cir.
1976); accord, United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
39. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 12-13.
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cific words in an enumeration describing the legal subject, the general
words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words."' 40 The language
in section 901(a) prohibiting discrimination in general should be lim-
ited to the scope of the more specific terms, which do not embrace em-
ployment discrimination. 41
Limiting the "subjected to discrimination" language of section
901(a) in this manner does not strip it of meaning. For example, the
"subjected to discrimination" clause would apply to a female medical
student who was accepted into a federally funded human anatomy
course (and therefore was not "excluded from participation"), and
given a federal scholarship (and therefore was not "denied the benefits
of'), but was awarded a blatantly unfair low grade by a professor who
believed that women have no place in medicine (and therefore was
"subjected to discrimination" on the basis of sex). The meaning of the
"subject to discrimination" clause is not of inherently greater scope
than the other clauses in section 901(a); rather, it stands on equal foot-
ing with them.42
The real question raised by section 901(a), as the North Haven
court recognized,43 is not whether the "no person" language was meant
to encompass employees, but whether employees may be properly con-
sidered participants in, or beneficiaries of, the federally funded pro-
grams covered by the statute. As the North Haven court noted, an
examination of the legislative history of Title IX is necessary to answer
this question. 4
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE IX
The legislative history of Title IX is less complete than many
others because no committee hearings were held on the bill that be-
came Title X.45 Moreover, there was no discussion or debate on the
40. 2A J. SUTHERLLAND, supra note 38, at 103; see Judge Gignoux's discussion in Brunswick
School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866, 870 (D. Me. 1978), a'd sub nom. Islesboro School
Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
41. Because the first two clauses of the statute appear to be limited in scope to "participants"
and "beneficiaries," respectively, the last clause must accordingly be limited to participants and
beneficiaries, despite its seemingly broader language.
42. Cf. Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977) (a female student who
allegedly received a poor grade because of her rejection of a male professor's sexual demands was
within the protection of Title IX).
43. 629 F.2d at 778.
44. Id.
45. Title IX stemmed from Amendment No. 874, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), to a pending
higher education bill, S. 659, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See note 48 infra. The Senate accepted
the amendment the same day it was introduced, without a committee hearing. 118 CONO. REc.
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Senate floor about whether section 901(a) was intended to cover em-
ployment discrimination, other than the remarks of Senator Bayh, the
bill's sponsor.46
There are three main elements to the analysis HEW and the North
Haven court used to support the contention that Congress intended
section 901(a) to encompass employment discrimination: (1) the re-
marks of the Senate sponsor of Title IX, Senator Bayh; (2) the failure of
Congress to enact a provision (section 904) that would have explicitly
excluded employment discrimination from Title IX; and (3) the post-
enactment action and inaction of Congress with respect to the HEW
Title IX implementing regulations.
A. The Remarks of Senator Bayh.
In interpreting legislative history the comments of the law's spon-
sor are entitled to great weight.47 Accordingly, the North Haven court
5815 (1972). Upon introducing his proposed amendment to section 901 in 1975, Senator Helms
made the following statement about the sparse legislative history of Title IX:
In 1972, Congress enacted legislation for the purpose of insuring that members of both
sexes are afforded an equal educational opportunity.... [Iin the House of Representa-
tives, that legislation was made a part of the education amendments of that year in the
full Education and Labor Committee, rather than the subcommittee, and it was not a
product of adequate public hearings. In the Senate, that legislation was made a part of
those amendments on the Senate floor, completely circumventing the committee and
hearing process. Therefore, no adequate record of the legislative intent of Title IX exists.
Senators, Representatives, and bureaucrats alike must view and construe this legislation
in a virtual vacuum.
121 CONG. REc. 23,845 (1975).
46. See 118 CoNG. REc. 5,803-15 (1972). There was a brief exchange between Senator Bayh
and Senator Pell about sexual balance on the faculties of private schools, id. 5,812-13, but it is not
clear that Senator Bayh was referring to section 901(a) in discussing this issue. The North Haven
court stated, however, that the colloquy between Senators Pell and Bayh "leaves little doubt that
Senator Bayh intended employment practices to be covered under what is now § 901." 629 F.2d
at 781. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit gave a different view:
While Senator Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be for a direct
answer to Senator Pell's question, we think [the North Haven court's] reading is
strained ....
... While it is true that there were occasional lapses during the discussions, wherein
one of the senators would telescope the sections [of Amendment No. 874], thereby sug-
gesting that employment was to be covered under the basic provisions of Title IX, a
careful examination of the debates ha[s] led us to conclude that these were the product of
the imprecision of oral discussion rather than a reflection that the Act intended section
901 of Title IX to embrace prohibitions against sex discrimination in employment.
Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 427-28 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979).
47. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 640 (1967) ("It is the sponsors
that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt") (quoting Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Distillers Co., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951)). See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 38, at
221-22 ("n the course of deliberations on a bill, legislators look to its sponsor. . . as one who is
expected to be particularly well informed about its purpose, meaning, and intended effect. In
recognition of this reality of legislative practice, courts give consideration to statements made by a
bil's sponsor. ..).
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and HEW turned to Senator Bayh's remarks to discover Congress's in-
tent in enacting Title IX. Senator Bayh made his comments upon in-
troducing Amendment No. 874 to the Education Amendments of
1972,48 which amendment included the provisions that eventually be-
came Title IX. Amendment No. 874 also amended Title VII49 and the
Equal Pay Act50 by specifically providing remedies for sex discrimina-
tion at educational institutions.51 The North Haven court concluded
from Senator Bayh's remarks that he intended that Title IX encompass
employment discrimination.5 2
Because Senator Bayh never directly stated that the portion of
Amendment No. 874 that became Title IX was specifically intended to
encompass employment discrimination, the North Haven court drew its
conclusion from the juxtaposition of Senator Bayh's statements. In his
introductory remarks about Amendment No. 874, Senator Bayh ex-
plained:
Amendment No. 874 is broad, but basically it closes loopholes in
existing legislation relating to general education programs and em-
ployment resulting from those programs.... More specifically, the
heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex discrimination in
educational programs receiving Federal funds. The amendment
would cover such crucial aspects as admissions procedures, scholar-
ships, andfaculty employment, with limited exceptions. Enforcement
powers include fund termination provisions-and appropriate safe-
guards-parallel to those found in title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. Other important provisions in the amendment would extend the
equal employment opportunities provisions of title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act to educational institutions, and extend the Equal
Pay for Equal Work Act to include executive, administrative, and
professional women.53
The North Haven court inferred from Senator Bayh's reference to
faculty employment that faculty employment practices were meant to
48. Senator Bayh introduced Amendment No. 874, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), on Feb. 28,
1972. 118 CONG. REc. 5802-03 (1972); see H.R. 7248, §§ 1006, 1008, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971)
(extending coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6
(1976), to previously exempt educational agencies and institutions); H.R. REP. No. 554, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 51, 108 (1971). Ultimately, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), amended Title VII, because it passed prior to the Education Amendments
of 1972. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administers Title VII. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(a) (1976), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a), (b) (1970). Section 1006 of Amendment
No. 874 also repealed the exemption for executive, administrative, and professional personnel
previously contained in the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1976), amending 29 U.S.C.
§ 213 (1970), which is administered by the Department of Labor.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1976).
51. See note 48 supra.
52. 629 F.2d at 780, 782.
53. 118 CONG. REc. 5,803 (1972) (emphasis added).
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be included under Title IX.5 4 Equally valid considerations, however,
can lead to the opposite conclusion. For instance, Senator Bayh's re-
marks may be read as referring to Amendment No. 874 as a whole,
encompassing the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act as
well as Title IX. Interpreted in this manner, the remarks about faculty
employment do not relate to the scope of section 901 and therefore do
not signify that Title IX was intended to embrace employment discrim-
ination.55
The North Haven court also discussed Senator Bayh's prepared
summary of his amendment, which he entered into the record immedi-
ately after his introductory remarks.5 6 In the section of his summary
entitled "Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Federally Funded Edu-
cation Programs," Senator Bayh wrote:
Central to my amendment are sections 1001-1005, which would pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education
programs....
This portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all ar-
eas where abuse has been mentioned--employment practices for
faculty and administrators, scholarship aid, admissions, access to pro-
grams within the institution such as vocational education classes, and
so forth.57
Because Senator Bayh referred to employment practices in the portion
of his prepared summary that discussed both the basic prohibition
against sex discrimination and the enforcement provisions, the North
Haven court inferred that he intended section 1001 (now section 901) to
encompass employment practices.58 Although this inference seems to
support strongly the court's view, the North Haven court itself pointed
54. 629 F.2d at 780.
55. Judge Gignoux disagreed with the North Haven court's interpretation:
Nor do Senator Bayh's remarks support defendants' position. Amendment 874, to which
Senator Bayh referred, was the original draft of Title IX, which included both § 901 and
the Title VII and Equal Pay Act amendments. It is apparent that his remarks, as well as
his synopsis of Title IX, insofar as they pertained to employment discrimination, can
only reasonably be understood as alluding to the Tide VII and Equal Pay Act amend-
ments, and not to § 901.
Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866, 873 (D. Me. 1978), afd sub nom, Islesboro
School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). One com-
mentator has recently agreed with Judge Gignoux, concluding that !'[a] careful reading of the
Senator's comments... reveals that these references to employment addressed that portion of the
bill seeking to amend Title VII, not the portion that became section 901(a) of what is now known
as Title IX." Friedman, supra note 28, at 64-65.
56. 118 CONG. REc. 5,806-08 (1972).
57. Id. 5,807 (emphasis added). At this stage in the legislative process, the portion of
Amendment No. 874 that subsequently became Title IX was designated Title X, and its sections
were numbered 1001, 1002, and so on. In the final version of the Act, these sections were renum-
bered 901, 902, and so on. See 118 CONG. REc. 5,803 (1972).
58. 629 F.2d at 780-81.
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out that Senator Bayh referred to section 1005 as one of the sections
"central to my amendment." 59 Section 1005 contained the proposed
amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196460 eliminating
the exception of educational institutions from the coverage of Title
VII.6 1 Thus, it is not clear whether Senator Bayh was referring to Title
VII or Title IX when he wrote that "this portion of the amendment
covers discrimination in all areas where abuse has been mentioned"
and included "employment practices for faculty and administrators" as
one of the areas of abuse.6 2
The North Haven court called this reference to section 1005 fin
"oversight. ' 63 If the court is correct, Senator Bayh failed to correct this
purported oversight three years later when he testified about Title IX at
the House hearings concerning HEW's Title IX implementing regula-
tions. 4 At these hearings, in both his prepared statement and his oral
remarks, Senator Bayh quoted his statement of February 28, 1972,
without correction.6 5 Apparently Senator Bayh himself did not con-
sider his reference to section 1005 to be an oversight; the North Haven
court's assertion that it was an oversight seems incorrect.
In short, no unequivocal indication of Senator Bayh's intent
emerges from his oral or written remarks about Amendment No. 874.
For every argument HEW and the North Haven court make in support
of the contention that Senator Bayh intended Title IX to cover employ-
ment discrimination, there is an equally valid argument that the sena-
59. Id. at 781 n. 11. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1976).
61...The section read as follows:
SEc. 1005 (a) Clause (1) of section 701(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e(b)(1)) is amended by inserting at the end thereof the following: "(except that this
clause shall not apply with respect to employees of a State, or a political subdivision
thereof, employed m an educational institution)".
(b) Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-1) is amended by
(1) inserting the words "educational institution," after the word "association," wherever
it appears in such section, and (2) by inserting a period after "religious activities" and
deleting the remainder of the sentence.
118 CONG. RIc. 5803 (1972). This section was ultimately enacted as part of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). See note 48 supra.
62. 118 CONG. REc. 5,807 (1972).
63. 629 F.2d at 781 n.ll. The reference to section 1005 has caused others difficulty as well.
In its brief in support of its petition for a writ of certiorari in Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano,
593 F.2d 424 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979), the Department of Justice called the
reference to section 1005 a "misprint." Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 16 n.13.
Even those opposed to HEW's regulations have called the reference to section 1005 inadvertent.
Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Harris v. Junior College Dist., 597
F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
64. See note 26 supra.
65. Hearings, supra note 26, at 170, 174.
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tor did not have that intent. Senator Bayh's remarks are simply too
equivocal to support HEW's interpretation of Title IX.
B. Congress's Failure to Enact Section 904.
The language of Title IX is almost identical to the language of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.66 Despite this similarity, there
is one important difference: section 604 in Title V167 specifically ex-
cludes employment discrimination from Title VI's purview, but there is
no similar provision in Title IX.
During the development of Title IX in Congress, a provision iden-
tical to section 604-section 904-was proposed by the House of Rep-
resentatives.6 8 In conference committee the Senate declined to approve
section 904 and the House receded without explanation.6 9 From Con-
gress's failure to add a section specifically excluding employment from
the purview of Title IX, HEW has argued 7° and the North Haven court
agreed 71 that Congress intended Title IX to cover employment discrim-
ination.
Most courts have rejected this argument, concluding instead that
section 904 was deleted in conference because its inclusion would have
been inconsistent with the amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and to the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which were included in
Amendment No. 874.72 Because the Title VII and Equal Pay amend-
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); see 117 CONG. REc. 30,407 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976): "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to
authorize action under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any employ-
ment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment."
68. H.R. REP. No. 554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 108, reurintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2462, 2566.
69. The Conference Committee Report contains the following statement:
(f) In addition, the House amendment, but not the Senate amendment, provided that
nothing in the title authorizes action by any department or agency with respect to any
employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except
where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment.
The House recedes.
.d. 2671-72.
70. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 18-19.
71. 629 F.2d at 778.
72. See, eg., Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979):
The elimination of [§ 904] does not indicate that Title IX was intended to cover employ-
ment practices. Rather it reflects the fact that at that point in the legislative process such
a provision in Pub. L. 92-318 would have been inaccurate and contradictory in light of
this statute's extension of existing laws to cover employment practices of educational
institutions.
Accord, Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 428 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
972(1979). See also Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 18-19.
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ments dealt explicitly with employment discrimination, it would have
been inconsistent for Congress to include in Amendment No. 874 a
provision specifically excluding employment discrimination from the
purview of Amendment No. 874. Section 904 was accordingly deleted.
The North Haven court, however, decided that any inconsistency
caused by section 904 could have been so easily corrected that section
904 must have been deleted for some other reason.73 The court pointed
out that Congress could easily have avoided any inconsistency caused
by section 904 by limiting its effect to section 901: "Congress could
readily have said: 'Nothing in § 901 shall apply to any employees of
any educational institution subject to this title except where a primary
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employ-
ment.' ",74 It is far more sensible to assume, however, that if Congress
had intended section 901 to encompass employment discrimination, it
would have expressed its intent simply and directly by including em-
ployment language in section 901, as HEW did in its implementing reg-
ulation.75 Senator McGovern provided an example that could have
expressed such intent. In 1971 he intended to offer an amendment to
the Omnibus Education Amendments Act of 197176 that would have
prohibited discrimination in higher education on the basis of sex. Sen-
ator McGovern's amendment, like Senator Bayh's, was modeled after
Title VI and contained this provision: "No person in the United States
shall be excluded on the grounds of sex from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, be subjected to discrimination under or be denied em-
ployment in connection with any program or activity assisted under this
Act."' 77 Senator McGovern ultimately did not introduce his amend-
ment out of deference to an amendment introduced earlier by Senator
Bayh (a precursor to Amendment No. 874),78 but his proposal indicates
the ease with which Congress could have made Title IX cover employ-
ment discrimination. The North Haven court's argument that section
904 was deleted for reasons other than its apparent inconsistency with
Amendment No. 874 as a whole is therefore unpersuasive.
The North Haven court also rejected an assertion that section 904
had been omitted simply to correct a drafting mistake-to remove a
provision that had been inadvertently included in the initial drafting of
73. 629 F.2d at 783.
74. Id.
75. See note 2 supra.
76. S. 659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
77. 117 CONG. REc. 30,411 (1971) (emphasis added).
78. Id; see id. 30,399 for Senator Bayh's amendment (Amendment No. 398 to S. 659, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)).
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Title IX.79 The court concluded:
In light of the ease with which an appropriate employment exclusion
could have been substituted, and in light of the Senate sponsor's view
of his amendment as expressed in his summary and in the debates
from which we have quoted above, we cannot agree that the omis-
sion was simply correction of a "drafting mistake." Rather, the dele-
tion of the House provision supports HEW's broader interpretation
of the Act. Appellees point us to no language anywhere in the legis-
lative history that even suggests that the conference committee de-
leted the provision merely for reasons of consistency, and we have
not been able to find any. In short, this was not, in our view a matter
of simply correcting legislative inadvertence.80
As the court's language indicates, this conclusion rests squarely on the
inference of congressional intent drawn from the deletion of section
904 from the final version of Title IX.81 The North Haven court was
apparently not made aware of evidence establishing that the omission
of section 904 was in fact the correction of a drafting mistake. This
evidence is contained in remarks by Congressman O'Hara, Chairman
of the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the House Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, during hearings held to review the
HEW Title IX implementing regulations in 1975.82 Congressman
O'Hara made his remarks immediately after testimony that section 904
was omitted because it was inconsistent with Title IX as a whole.83
Congressman O'Hara spoke of the fate of section 904:
... If you want to know, 904 got in by mistake, by a drafting error.
At my instigation in the committee the title, or what became title IX,
was rewritten. You see ... title IX was brought to us ... as an
amendment to title VI and I had a number of objections to that be-
cause I had a lot to do, I thought at least, with getting title VI into the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
... So I was very nervous about this effort to amend title VI because
it opened up, it made all of title VI open to amendment when we hit
the floor with the bill.
So I insisted instead of amending title VI that we write and put into
the bill a new title that was equivalent to title VI in terms of discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex, but it would not then, in a parliamentarian
sense, open up title VI to amendments on the floor.
79. 629 F.2d at 783. The "drafting mistake" theory was put forth in Kuhn, Title IX Employ-
ment andAthletics Are Outside HEWs Jurisdiction, 65 GEo. L.J. 49, 57 (1976).
80. 629 F.2d at 783.
81. See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
82. Hearings, supra note 26.
83. Id. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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The staff was given overnight to draft this whole thing and they
goofed. 904 got in there by mistake. It was a cut and paste job.
There was a Xerox of the Civil Rights Act that they just pasted in.
Then when we got around to straightening things out in confer-
ence we improved the drafting and dropped it out.
Now, great significance is being given to the fact that it was
dropped out. It was dropped out because it got in through a drafting
error. So the quiet, easy way to get it out was to slide it out some-
where along the line without having to go through a long explanation
as to how it got in. So much for that part of the argument.84
Although "the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous
basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one,"8' 5 Congressman O'Hara
was not relating a personal version of the intent of an earlier Congress;
rather, he was describing a mechanical error that occurred during the
drafting of the House version of Title IX.8 6 Congressman O'Hara's re-
marks emphatically refute the contention that section 904 was deleted
because Congress intended Title IX to encompass employment dis-
crimination.8 7 The deletion merely remedied a drafting mistake and
thus removed a provision that would have been inconsistent with the
Title VII and Equal Pay Act amendments in Amendment No. 874.88
C. The Post-Enactment History of Title IX.
Although the North Haven court recognized that the action or in-
action of a subsequent Congress is usually not probative of the views of
an earlier Congress,8 9 it nevertheless decided that "congressional reac-
tion to the Title IX regulations, in the context of the legislative history
as a whole, lends some additional weight to the view that § 901 was
84. Hearings, supra note 26, at 409.
85. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1959).
86. There is no need to question the veracity of his statement. Congressman O'Hara has
consistently opposed HEW's Title IX implementing regulations. See note 14 supra.
87. No federal court that has decided the question of the validity of HEW's Title IX imple-
menting regulations has quoted Congressman O'Hara's statement. A possible explanation for this
failure is that when the Kuhn article, supra note 79, asserted that section 904 was a drafting
mistake, the author did not explain the origin of this assertion. The citation the article gives to
support the "drafting mistake" theory is to "Minutes of the House Comm. on Education andLabor,
at 9 (Sept. 30, 1971).' Kuhn, supra note 79, at 57 n.43. Had Ms. Kuhn explained that she knew
section 904 was a drafting mistake because Congressman O'Hara had told her so at a public
hearing, the North Haven court might have given her assertion more weight. It is not clear why
Ms. Kuhn failed to cite to Congressman O'Hara's statement in her article. Another commentator,
who recently concluded that the Title IX implementing regulations are valid, cited to the exact
page on which Congressman O'Hara's remarks appear, yet failed to discuss O'Hara's explanation
of the history of section 904. See Comment, Eliminating Sex Discrimination in EducationalInstitu-
tions Does Title IXReach Employment?, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 417, 427 n.47 (1980).
88. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
89. 629 F.2d at 784.
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expressly intended to relate to employment practices." 90 Close exami-
nation of the post-enactment history, however, reveals that it has less
probative force than the North Haven court attributed to it.
The court pointed first to the failure of the House and Senate to
disapprove by resolution the HEW Title IX implementing regula-
tions,91 stating that this failure "is not without significance .... -92
The court overlooked, however, the fact that the resolution introduced
by Senator Helms93 called for approval of all the HEW regulations, not
just the subpart that included section 901. There is therefore no way to
ascertain the intent of the Senate with respect to the employment regu-
lation specifically. Likewise, in the House of Representatives Con-
gressmen Quie and Erlenborn introduced an amendment to
Congressman O'Hara's concurrent resolution disapproving all of
HEW's Title IX regulations.94 Their amendment stated: "Subpart E
[of the HEW regulations] . .. is inconsistent with the Act [section
901(a)] since by the amendment to Title VII of the Civl Rights Act of
1964 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Congress has con-
ferred such jurisdiction upon the United States Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission and the Department of Labor. '95 Congressman
O'Hara's concurrent resolution as a whole never passed out of the Edu-
cation and Labor Committee,96 so there is no way to know whether the
rejection of the resolution had anything to do with the Quie/Erlenborn
amendment. In sum, Congress's failure to disapprove the Title IX reg-
ulations says nothing about whether Congress intended Title IX to
cover employment practices.
The North Haven court also discussed the Senate's failure to pass a
bill Senator Helms introduced later in 1975.97 This bill read in part:
"Nothing in [section 901] shall apply to any employee of any educa-
tional institution subject to this title." 98 The court failed to note, how-
ever, that there were nine other substantive provisions of Senator
90. Id.
91. See note 14 supra.
92. 629 F.2d at 783.
93. S. Con. Res. 46,94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 17,301 (1975). "The resolution was
referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which took no action on it." 629
F.2d at 783.
94. See note 14 supra.
95. Unpublished Amendment to H.R. Con. Res. 330, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Post-
secondary Educ. ofthe House Comm on Educ. and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975) (on file with
the Committee), quoted in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 783 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. grantedsub non, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S. Ct. 1345 (1981).
96. 629 F.2d at 784.
97. S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CoNo. Rnc. 23,845 (1975). See note 14 supra.
98. S. 2146, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 CONG. RIc. 23,845 (1975).
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Helms's bill that were intended to limit the scope of other portions of
HEW's Title IX implementing regulations.99 Because the bill as a
whole failed to pass, it is again impossible to isolate the Senate's intent
with respect to the proposed change to section 901.
D. Summary.
The North Haven court's interpretation of congressional intent was
based largely on Congress's deletion of a proposed provision of Title
IX that would have explicitly excluded employment discrimination
from the purview of Title IX. 0o The purpose of this deletion, however,
was to correct a drafting mistake; it is incorrect to infer that the deletion
evidences Congress's intent regarding employment practices. 01 More-
over, the comments of Title IX's sponsor at best provide only equivocal
support for the HEW regulations. 10 2 Finally, the post-enactment legis-
lative history of Title IX provides little or no support for the North
Haven court's interpretation of congressional intent with respect to the
HEW regulations. 10 3
II. THE ANALOGY OF TITLE IX TO TITLE VI: A NEW APPROACH
Title IX is based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.104
"The drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would be inter-
preted and applied as Title VI had been during the preceding eight
years."' 05 It is therefore appropriate to investigate the regulatory and
99. See id. 23,847.
100. See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 82-87 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 47-65 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 89-99 supra and accompanying text.
104. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (holding in part by analogy to
Title VI that Title IX created a private right of action).
105. Id. at 696. If anything is clear concerning Senator Bayh's intent with regard to Title IX,
it is that he expected Title IX to work the same way Title VI had been working. In the senator's
summary of Title IX, which he entered into the Congressional Record when he introduced Title
IX, Senator Bayh wrote:
Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally assisted programs and activities is
already prohibited by title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohi-
bition does not apply to discrimination on the basis of sex. In order to close this loop-
hole, my amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions which generally
parallel the provisions of title VI.
118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972). Later that year, in a letter to Senator Pell, Senator Bayh wrote:
It is helpful to remember that the provisions of my amendment in question are parallel
to those found in the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Since 1964, there has been ample opportu-
nity to, establish enforcement procedure with respect to discrimination on the basis of
race; enforcement of my amendment will draw heavily on those precedents.
d. 18,437. Three years later, while testifying at the hearings on the Title IX implementing regula-
tions, Senator Bayh stated: "Mhe setting up of an identical administrative structure and the use
of virtually identical statutory language substantiate the intent of the Congress that the interpreta-
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judicial history of Title VI to determine how Title VI has been inter-
preted by HEW and the courts to determine the proper scope of Title
IX.
Despite the presence of section 604, which seemingly excludes em-
ployment discrimination from Title VI,1I 6 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education l0 7
held that Title VI may be applied to prevent segregation in the alloca-
tion of faculty to schools in a school district. The court reasoned that
[flaculty intergration is essential to student desegregation .... Sec-
tion 604 was never intended as a limitation on desegregation of
schools. If the defendant's view of Section 604 were correct the pur-
poses of the statute would be frustrated, for one of the keys to deseg-
regation is the integration of faculty. As long as a school has a Negro
faculty it will always have a Negro student body. As the District
Court for the Western District of Virginia put it in Brown v. County
School Board of Frederick County, 1965, 245 F. Supp. 549, 560:
"[T]he presence of all Negro teachers in a school attended solely by
Negro pupils in the past denotes that school a 'colored school' just as
certainly as if the words were printed across its entrance in six-inch
letters."108
Other courts have also concluded that Title VI may be interpreted
broadly enough to affect employment practices, despite the prohibition
of section 604. In a recent decision the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that "because of § 604, Title VI does not provide a judicial
remedy for employment discrimination by institutions receiving federal
funds unless. . . discrimination in employment necessarily causes dis-
crimination against the primary beneficiaries of the federal aid."'10 9
These cases teach that Title VI applies to discriminatory employment
practices only when such practices have a discriminatory effect on stu-
dents through the creation of a discriminatory environment.
tion of Title IX was to provide the same coverage as had been provided under Title VI." Hear-
ings, supra note 26, at 170.
106. See note 67 supra.
107. 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), a ffden bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
840 (1967).
108. 372 F.2d at 883.
109. Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 1978) (emphasis
in original), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979); accord, Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d
1068, 1078 (5th Cir. 1969) ("If the funds provided by [the federal government].. . support a
program which is infected by a discriminatory environment, then termination of such funds is
proper [under Title VI]") (dictum); United States v. El Camino Community College Dist., 454 F.
Supp. 825 (C.D. Cal. 1978), a f'd, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980)
(Title VI authorizes the Office for Civil Rights to investigate the employment practices of a college
receiving federal aid to determine whether there is discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or
national origin that affects the students at the college).
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In 1973 HEW amended its Title VI implementing regulations to
embody the Jefferson County holding. The amendment reads:
Where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is not
to provide employment, but discrimination on the ground of race,
color, or national origin in the employment practices of the recipient
or other persons subject to the regulation tends, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, to exclude individuals from participa-
tion in, to deny them the benefits of, or to subject them to discrimna-
tion under any program to which this regulation applies, [this
regulation] shall apply to the employment practices of the recipient
or other persons subject to the regulation, to the extent necessary to
assure equality of opportunity to, and nondiscriminatory treatment
of, beneficiaries.' 10
Recently, in Caupfield v. Board of Education,1 1 Judge Weinstein of the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York upheld the validity
of this regulation and simultaneously showed how Title IX may simi-
larly be applied to employment discrimination on the basis of sex in
educational institutions. In Cauleld local school officials, school
boards, supervisors, teachers, and parents challenged an agreement be-
tween the New York City Board of Education and HEW's Office for
Civil Rights that purported to remedy alleged violations of Titles VI
and IX by the Board of Education in the hiring and assignment of
teachers and in the hiring of supervisory personnel. The plaintiffs ar-
gued "that under Title VI and Title IX, HEW and [the Office of Civil
Rights] had no jurisdiction to investigate or seek compliance with re-
gard to the Board's teacher and supervisory employment practices." 112
Judge Weinstein, addressing the Title VI question first, adopted the Jef-
ferson County court's reasoning and concluded that
[djiscrimination by race in the hiring and assignment of teachers or
supervisors, as a matter of law and of fact, constitutes discrimination
against students. And because students are clearly the ultimate bene-
ficiaries of federal assistance to school systems, HEW's [Title VI] reg-
ulation. . ., as applied to this case, constitutes a valid interpretation
of the statutory mandate.113
Judge Weinstein then addressed the question of Title IX's applica-
bility. Agreeing with the holdings of courts that have found HEW's
Title IX implementing regulations overbroad,1 4 Judge Weinstein con-
cluded:
110. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(c)(3) (1980).
111. 486 F. Supp. 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 632 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980).
112. Id. at 879.
113. Id. at 882.
114. Judge Weinstein first summarized the arguments of the courts that have found HEW's
Title IX implementing regulations overbroad. He then stated: "It would be hard to sustain
HEW's Title IX jurisdiction in this case under the direct authority of the department's 'employ-
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To the extent that [defendant's argument] proceeds on the general
assumption that wherever a grantee's employee has substantial con-
tact with a direct beneficiary, all the grantee's employment practices
with regard to that employee are subject to Title IX, it is overbroad
under the teaching of the Romeo line of cases. But insofar as this
theory proceeds by analogy to that accepted for reaching school em-
ployment practices under Title VI-that such practices may be
reached where there is an arguable discriminatory impact on direct
beneficiary students-it provides a colorable basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction in this case. 115
Under the Caulfield rationale Title IX, as an analogue of Title VI, may
operate to prevent sex discrimination in faculty employment in the
same way that Title VI operates to prevent racial discrimination in
faculty employment. For either statute to apply, there must be a show-
ing that the discriminatory employment practices have a discriminatory
impact on the beneficiaries of federal financial assistance-the stu-
dents. The Jefferson County court noted that racial discrimination in
faculty hiring has a discriminatory effect on students and defeats the
attainment of desegregated schools. 116 Judge Weinstein, however, rec-
ognized that similar reasoning may not be so facilely applied to sex
discrimination:
This is not to suggest that the possible effect of sexually discrimina-
tory school employment practices on students is as clear or severe as
that of racially discriminatory practices, nor that our society's dis-
crimination against women-often based on outmoded notions
rather than animus-is as pernicious or historically ingrained in law
and practice as that against blacks. All this court concludes is that
HEW could reasonably proceed in this case under Title IX on a the-
ory that school employment practices which involve systemic dis-
crimination against women in access to supervisory positions had, or
would have, a deleterious impact on students as direct beneficiaries
of federal financial assistance. 117
Although Title IX may well confer upon HEW the authority to
regulate sexually discriminatory employment practices where a delete-
rious impact on students can be shown, Judge Weinstein is arguably
incorrect in saying that HEW can proceed on this theory under the
authority of the Title IX implementing regulations as currently written.
Judge Feikens pointed out in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 18 a
district court decision invalidating the Title IX regulations, that
ment' regulations .... [C]ases considering the validity of these regulations have almost uni-
formly concluded that they are beyond the authority granted by the statute." Id. at 883.
115. Id. at 884.
116. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
117. 486 F. Supp. at 885.
118. 438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aft'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
972 (1979).
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[t]here is no provision in any of these regulations which specifies that
the particular employment practice regulated must result in substan-
tial sex discrimination against students in federally financed educa-
tion programs, nor does it appear that HEW considers itself under
any obligation to establish such resultant student discrimination
before the requirements of Subpart E may be enforced.1 9
Thus, in the absence of a provision in the Title IX regulations requiring
a showing of harmful impact upon students resulting from discrimina-
tory faculty employment practices, HEW does not have the authority
under Title IX to regulate the employment practices of educational in-
stitutions receiving federal financial assistance.
Judge Weinstein's analysis of the scope of Title IX reconciles some
inconsistencies in the various readings of Title IX's legislative history.
The analysis reveals, for instance, how Title IX may be construed to
affect faculty employment. There may, therefore, have been no incon-
sistency or error when Senator Bayh referred to section 901 as encom-
passing faculty employment; he may have had in mind the Jefferson
County court's rationale for applying Title VI to racial discrimination
in faculty employment.'20 This possibility is supported by Senator
Bayh's statement that he envisioned that the Title VI enforcement
scheme would be used to enforce Title IX.12' Because Senator Bayh's
intent regarding the close relationship between Title VI and Title IX is
clear, it is difficult to understand why HEW did not simply transfer the
enforcement scheme embodied in the Title VI regulations 122 to the Ti-
tle IX implementing regulations. To do so would have sensibly and
consistently analogized the Title VI implementing regulations to the
Title IX implementing regulations, and would have been in accord
with Senator Bayh's view of the relationship of Title IX to Title VI.
III. CONCLUSION
Although HEW's Title IX implementing regulations are over-
broad as written, Title IX may apply to sex discrimination in faculty
employment in the same way that Title VI applies to racial discrimina-
tion in faculty employment. In order to implement Title IX in a man-
ner consistent with its intended scope, the Department of Education
119. 438 F. Supp. at 1035; accord, Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992, 993-94 (9th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam), cert. grantedsub nomr Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 101 S. Ct. 563 (1980); Isles-
boro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 430 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
The North Haven court never reached this question because it held that Title IX authorizes the
HEW regulations as written. 629 F.2d at 786.
120. See notes 106-09 supra and accompanying text.
121. See note 105 supra.
122. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
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should eliminate the "employment" language from its Title IX regula-
tions and substitute the language of the Title VI regulations governing
employment practices. This proposal would allow the Department to
regulate faculty employment where faculty discrimination on the basis
of sex has a harmful effect on students, who are the true beneficiaries of
federal financial assistance under Title IX.
Bernard H. Friedman
